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We define the idea of real path quantum theory, a realist generalisation of quantum theory in which
it is postulated that the configuration space path actually followed by a closed quantum system is
probabilistically chosen. This is done a postulate defining probabilities for paths, which we propose
are determined by an expression involving path amplitudes and a distance function that quantifies
path separation. We suggest a possible form for a path probability postulate and explore possible
choices of distance function, including choices suitable for Lorentz or generally covariant versions of
real path quantum theory. We set out toy models of quantum interferometry and show that in these
models the probability postulate and specific distance functions do indeed give a physically sensible
path ontology. These functions can be chosen so as to predict quantum interference for interference of
microscopic quantum systems and the failure of interference for macroscopic quantum systems. More
generally, they predict interference when the beams are close, and its failure when they are far apart,
as determined by the distance function. If taken seriously in its present relatively unconstrained
form, real path quantum theory thus motivates experimental tests of quantum interference in all
unexplored regimes defined by potentially physically interesting parameters, including the mass of
the beam object, the beam separation distance, the beam separation time, and many others. We
discuss open questions raised by these ideas.
INTRODUCTION
Feynman’s path integral formulation [10] of quantum theory is widely seen as an elegant and beautiful unifying
principle that may yet turn out to be the fundamentally correct way to define quantum field theory and quantum
gravity. It also motivates Hartle and Hawking’s intriguing no-boundary proposal [18] and other theories of the
cosmological initial conditions, giving rise to some hope of a unified theory of dynamics and boundary conditions.
Rigorously defining path integrals in physically relevant quantum theories poses formidable and unresolved technical
difficulties. Path integrals are nonetheless often said to give an elegant and intuitively appealing explanation of the
relationship between classical and quantum theories, and specifically to allow a simple derivation of the classical
principle of stationary action from quantum theory. While the technical problems in rigorously defining path integrals
are generally acknowledged to be formidable, the conceptual and logical problems in the path integral account of the
relationship between classical and quantum theories have received, surprisingly, relatively little attention.
In this paper we first discuss why, even if we had a mathematically rigorous path integral for some preferred choice
of variables, we could not use it to explain why macroscopic objects approximately follow classical trajectories.
We then explore a new way of understanding quantum path integrals, defined by a a new path probability postulate
that involves a relatively simple modification to the standard path integral. The proposal has some clear conceptual
advantages compared to the standard path integral. It gives a clear physical meaning to the paths and to probabilities
associated with them. It also suggests a clear and conceptually unproblematic way of justifying from first principles
the appearance of quasiclassical trajectories.
Like the standard quantum path integral, our modified path integrals are not presently rigorously defined. However,
the formal path integrals we consider do at least tend to suppress contributions from “pathological” paths – that is,
paths that are very far from intuitively sensible representations of the physics of the relevant system. This perhaps
offers some grounds for hope that more rigorous definitions might be achievable, at least for a wider range of physically
interesting models than those that have rigorously defined standard path integrals. Another unresolved issue is that
our path probability postulate requires a choice for a distance function between paths, and at present we see no unique
natural choice. However, some simple and interesting possibilities suggest themselves.
We illustrate the ideas of real path quantum theory in toy models. In these models, the generalized path integral
rules we consider give a simple and physically reasonable ontology. In general, they make different experimental
predictions to those made by standard quantum theory. These differences can be small enough to be undetectable
in microscopic interference experiments but large enough to predict that macroscopic objects follow definite classical
trajectories, even in experiments where quantum theory predicts they should display interference.
We focus throughout on position space path integrals. This follows a venerable tradition [5, 6, 13, 14] in being
2willing to pay the price of singling out some particular variable or variables in order to define equations structures that
address the problem of the appearance of quasiclassicality within quantum theory and the broader quantum reality
problem. It also follows the mainstream of that tradition in seeing position as a natural choice. However, we certainly
do not mean to exclude other choices from consideration; it would be interesting to explore the various possibilities.
And indeed, of course, if our ideas can be successfully applied to path integral formulations of quantum gravity, some
more fundamental choice – perhaps involving paths of geometries – would need to be made.
It will be evident that the research program we outline here is incomplete: this paper begins to explore ideas and
raises some difficult questions for which we presently do not have answers. That said, at the technically unrigorous
level of argument used in standard path integral discussions, our proposed axioms do suggest a potentially conceptually
satisfactory unified explanation for the quasiclassical behaviour of macroscopic objects and the observation of quantum
interference in microscopic systems. They also suggest a way of defining a large class of generalizations of quantum
theory – real path quantum theories – that are equipped with a natural realist ontology and that have experimentally
testable consequences. While there are certainly many important and potentially daunting unresolved technical
issues, there seems no intrinsic conceptual or logical obstacle to defining this ontology in a way that respects Lorentz
invariance, general covariance, and other symmetries.
In summary then, we have some new ideas that motivate a research program with the ambitious aim of generalising
the quantum path integral to give a unified description of microscopic and macroscopic physics that is consistent with
special and general relativity and applicable to quantum field theory and quantum gravity. We comment briefly on
the relationship of these ideas to other work on finding realist versions of standard or generalised quantum theory, at
the end of the paper.
PATH INTEGRALS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF STATIONARY ACTION
“Before we go on making the mathematics more complete, we shall compare this quantum law with
the classical rule. At first sight, from Eq. (2.15), all paths contribute equally, although their phases vary,
so it is not clear how, in the classical limit, some particular path becomes most important. The classical
approximation, however, corresponds to the case that the dimensions, masses, times, etc., are so large that
S is enormous in relation to h¯. Then the phase of the contribution S/h¯ is some very, very large angle.
The real (or imaginary) part of φ is the cosine (or sine) of this angle. This is as likely to be plus as minus.
Now if we move the path as shown in Fig 2-1 by a small amount δx, small on the classical scale, the
change in S is likewise small on the classical scale, but not when measured in the tiny units of h¯. These
small changes in path will, generally, make enormous changes in phase, and our cosine or sine will oscillate
exceedingly rapidly between plus and minus values. The total contribution will then add to zero; for if
one path makes a positive contribution, another infinitesimally close (on a classical scale) makes an equal
negative contributin, so that no net contribution arises.
Therefore, no path really needs to be considered if the neighbouring path has a different action; for
the paths in the neighbourhood cancel out the contribution. But for the special path x¯(t), for which S
is an extremum, a small change in path produces, in the first order at least, no change in S. All the
contributions from the paths in this region are nearly in phase, at phase Scl/h¯, and do not cancel out.
Therefore, only for paths in the vicinity of x¯(t) can we get important contributions, and in the classical
limit we need only consider this particular trajectory as being of importance. In this way the classical
laws of motion arise from the quantum laws.
We may note that trajectories which differ from x¯(t) contribute as long as the action is still within
about h¯ of Scl. The classical trajectory is indefinite to this slight extent, and this rule serves as a measure
of the limitations of the precision of the classically defined trajectory.”
(Feynman and Hibbs, [10]; italics original, bold face added)
Some version of this argument is still propagated in many quantum theory lecture courses to this day. However,
it is conceptually and logically confused, and the main conclusion – which we have highlighted in bold face above –
does not follow.
3Decoherence and the appearance of quasiclassicality: the Feynman-Hibbs lacuna in context
Feynman and Hibbs start from a true statement – or, at least, one that could be true if rigorous definitions
were available – that notes that two different situations are related mathematically. Namely, we can calculate as if
the approximately classical trajectories were the only relevant ones, even though actually they are not. They add
the premise that quantum theory is fundamentally correct – which superficially may seem reasonable enough, since
we don’t have a better theory. They also add the empirical observation that we see classical systems approximately
following classical equations of motion. But then, rather than testing whether we can actually derive a fully consistent
explanation of the appearance of quasi-classical physics from quantum theory, they effectively assume the answer.
That is, they assume the appearance of quasiclassicalitymust be directly derivable from path integral quantum theory.
Given that, the calculational result must be a derivation of the empirical observation, since it is essentially the only
relevant equation that the theory gives us. But, of course. being able to calculate as if something were true isn’t the
same as showing that it is true from first principles.
Another version of this error arises in attempts to explain the appearance of a quasiclassical world from quantum
decoherence, starting from the correct observation that decoherence models show that one can calculate as if an
initially pure quantum system is represented by a proper probabilistic mixed state after interacting with an apparatus,
although in fact it is represented by the reduced density matrix of an entangled state. Extended discussions of this
point can be found in Refs. [16, 28] and elsewhere.
Not only do these attempts to derive the appearance of quasiclassical world from unitary quantum theory fail, but
– in the view of many physicists – all such attempts have failed. Unitary quantum theory can only be made sense
of via many-worlds ideas, and there is, after 55 years, no consensus even among proponents of those ideas as to how
they can be made rigorous and can give a scientific theory with explanatory power [28].
This motivates exploring ways to go beyond standard quantum theory, for example by adding extra mathematical
structure (as in de Broglie-Bohm theory [5, 6]) or new dynamical laws (as in GRWP models [13, 14]). We explore a
new idea in this direction below, adapting the existing path integral formalism by adding new postulates.
That said, as we have indicated, there is of course not currently a complete consensus on whether quantum theory
can explain the appearance of quasiclassicality. For those still unpersuaded that it cannot, a more conservative
motivation is that, whatever the status of standard quantum theory, natural-looking additions or alterations should
be explored, since they might either give a valuable new perspective on standard quantum theory, or interesting new
generalizations of quantum theory that can be tested.
Examining the Feynman-Hibbs argument in a toy model
To see the problem with the Feynman-Hibbs argument more clearly, it is very helpful to separate conceptual
questions from the problems of rigorously defining any path integral. To this end we define a toy discrete path
integral model (which we will call M1) for the centre of mass motion of a single massive object in position space,
involving some large finite number of paths from A to B. Because the number of paths is finite, we can rigorously
define the path integral and related quantities. We define the model to have a set of paths that have mathematical
properties analogous to those of quasiclassical trajectories – those in the neighbourhood of the stationary action path
– in the standard quantum path integral. This allows us to focus on the conceptual question of what conclusions
about quasiclassical physics do or do not follow from the path integral.
For simplicity, we define the model M1 so that each path has phase ±1, and we take the paths to have some
natural ordering P1, . . . , PN , in which paths Pi and Pi+1 are supposed to be physically adjacent. This is not generally
entirely realistic, even in the simple versions of path integrals defined in discrete models of 1 + 1 dimensional space-
time. However, it simplifies the model while still allowing it to illustrate a key point that can be replicated in more
geometrically realistic models.
We suppose also that we can identify paths PM , . . . , PM+K that correspond approximately to the quasiclassical
trajectories for the particle, where M is odd, N −M −K is even, 1 < M < M +K < N and K ≪ M,N . We call
these the quasiclassical paths in the model. Finally, we suppose that the path amplitudes A(Pi) obey
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1 , (1)
A(Pi) = 1 for M ≤ i ≤M +K ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M−K for M +K < i ≤ N .
In other words, the amplitudes alternate in pairs before and after the quasiclassical paths, which all have amplitude
4+1. Listed in order they are
1,−1, . . . , 1,−1, 1, 1, . . .1,−1, 1, . . . ,−1, 1 .
This is intended to model the features of the quantum path integral relevant to Feynman and Hibbs’ argument.
The quasiclassical paths in the quantum path integral are close to one another; in our discrete model they are all
adjacent. The quasiclassical path amplitudes in the quantum path integral are approximately constant; in our model
they are precisely equal, taking the value +1. The amplitudes of paths away from the quasiclassical paths oscillate
rapidly in the quantum path integral; in our discrete model they oscillate as rapidly as possible, alternately taking
the values ±1.
Since the path amplitudes either side of the quasiclassical paths cancel in pairs, we have the arithmetical identity
N∑
i=1
A(Pi) =
M+K∑
i=M
A(Pi) .
So we can indeed calculate the total sum – our discrete version of the path integral – by summing the amplitudes of the
quasiclassical paths and ignoring the rest. But notice that this property per se does not single out the quasiclassical
paths in our model as special. For example, we could also write
N∑
i=1
A(Pi) =
K+1∑
i=1
A(P2i−1) .
More generally,
N∑
i=1
A(Pi) =
∑
i∈I
A(Pi)
for any size (K + 1) subset I of the set
{1, 3, . . . ,M,M + 1, . . . ,M +K,M +K + 2, . . . , N} = {i : A(Pi) = +1} ,
that is, the set of paths with amplitude +1.
It is true that the quasiclassical paths are all adjacent in our ordering, while the other paths are not. But nothing in
the definition of the path integral or any standard presentation of its physical implications gives a special ontological
status to subsets of adjacent paths. To derive classical laws of motion, we need to be able to make a statement about
the actual trajectories of macroscopic objects. In particular, here, we need to be able to derive that the object follows
one of the quasiclassical paths from A to B. This does not follow from the rules of standard path integral quantum
theory, as set out in Feynman and Hibbs or elsewhere.
This point is worth elaborating. The standard treatment of the quantum path integral only defines a transition
probability from A to B. It does not supply a rule that tells us that the system actually follows any path. In particular,
it gives no rule that ensures the system will follow one path from among a set of adjacent paths with similar phases
and amplitudes, or even that we can make some more coarse-grained statement about its behaviour characterized by
that set.
In fact, when path integrals are being discussed in contexts where no quasiclassical dynamics is expected to emerge,
authors often suggest an intuitive picture according to which, since every path amplitude has modulus one, in some
loose sense they are all equally significant: the quantum system “follows all possible paths”.
Of course, this intuition isn’t properly justified either. It’s not even clear what it is really intended to mean.
Sometimes some form of Everettian many-worlds picture seems to be intended. While it is difficult to criticize so
underdeveloped an intuition, three comments are worth making here. First, there have been many different attempts
to define an ontologically sensible and scientifically useful Everettian picture of quantum theory [28], and in the view
of many (e.g. [1, 20, 23, 27]), none of them succeed. Second, elementary paths in the path integral cannot be identified
with the quasiclassical branching worlds that are normally thought to be crucial in Everettian explanations. Third,
in any case, without an ontological rule, we can’t use the path integral to say anything about what the system does
between A and B.
Notice also that this intuition about the meaning of the path integral for microscopic quantum systems directly
conflicts with the intuition discussed above for macroscopic objects following quasiclassical trajectories. According to
this folk intuition, they don’t follow all possible paths, but instead follow some quasiclassical path.
5As this conflict of intuitions highlights, it is not the case that there is some tacit rule, generally familiar to experts
but unaccountably omitted from textbooks, that unifies the path integral treatments of the microscopic and the
macroscopic. We have here a genuine conceptual problem that needs to be resolved.
Fortified by the inescapability of this conclusion, while also admiring the beauty and generality of the path integral
formalism and suspecting that despite its present flaws the Feynman-Hibbs argument may contain the germ of a key
insight about the relationship between quasiclassical and quantum physics, we now look for fresh inspiration in the
form of alternative ways of thinking about quantum path integrals that might make more conceptual and physical
sense.
REAL PATH QUANTUM THEORY
Unphysicality of path probabilities in the standard path integral
Consider the position space path integral for a single non-relativistic particle transition from point A = (xA, tA)
to point B = (xB , tB). Assigning probabilities to individual paths in this integral makes no evident sense, as noted
above. Consider again the naive rule that the probability of following any given path P is proportional to the square
of the associated amplitude: Prob(P ) = C|A(P )|2. Each path P has amplitude A(P ) = exp(iS(P )), so adopting this
rule would make all paths have equal probability weight. In realistic models, these weights are unnormalisable, so that
we cannot obtain a path probability distribution from this rule. Nor, even if we could somehow solve this problem,
would adopting this rule help explain the origins of quasiclassicality, since if any sensible definition of measure existed,
the approximately classical paths of a macroscopic object should have measure zero among the set of all paths.
The path probability postulate
If we can’t extract a sensible explanation of quasiclassical physics (or indeed do anything more than calculate
transition probabilities) from the path integral in its present form, then perhaps we need to change the definition of
the path integral, or add additional postulates, or both. The difficulty in making physical sense of the path integral
seems to be connected with the fact that it hints at an interpretation in which paths have probabilities, while at
the same time suggesting conflicting intuitions about these physical path probabilities. We thus propose to explore
the implications of explicitly assigning probabilities to paths via a new postulate. The idea here is that we define a
quantity Prob(P ) that has the standard properties of a probability:
Prob(P ) ≥ 0
∫
paths P
dP Prob(P ) = 1 .
This quantity represents the probability that the given path P was actually followed. Physical reality – in an
experiment, or, in principle, in the evolution of the cosmos from initial to final state – is given by the chosen path.
Specifically, we will consider a postulate of the form:
Prob(P ) = C |
∫
dQ exp(−iS(Q)) exp(−d(P,Q))|2 (
∫
dQ exp(−d(P,Q)))−1 . (2)
Here and below we take h¯ = 1. For the moment we take the integrals in this expression to be over all paths Q
that have the same endpoints (A and B) as P . (Note that we would need to allow larger classes of paths to obtain
an effective description of experiments with an extended initial wave function or to discuss the general possibilities
allowed in cosmology.) We take d(P,Q) to be some distance measure defined between paths P and Q. This measure
d is supposed in some natural sense (to be elaborated) to say how distinct the paths are.
Note that at present we have no compelling reason to believe that there is a unique physically sensible choice for
either the form of (2) or the distance function d. We aim to show that the simple path probability rule (2) does lead
to physically interesting conclusions for some choices of distance function. We find this encouraging, since it is not
a priori obvious that there are any modifications of the quantum path integral that give physically sensible results
in agreement with empirical evidence for both quasiclassical and microscopic quantum systems. For concreteness, we
focus on (2) here, and explore various distance functions. However, it is certainly also interesting to explore the range
of physically sensible alternatives to (2).
6In the form just given, the path probability postulate assigns probabilities for paths between A and B conditioned
on the fact that A and B are the initial and final states respectively. Under this conditioning assumption, the
normalisation factor C is defined by
∫
paths:A→B
dP Prob(P ) = 1 . (3)
Without the conditioning assumption on the final state, the path probability postulate also implies a new rule for the
total probability for arriving at the final point B from the initial point A:
Prob(B|A) =
∫
paths:A→B
dP Prob(P ) . (4)
In this context C is defined by normalising over a complete basis of final states:
∫
final states B
dB Prob(B|A) = 1 . (5)
For example, for a single particle in Minkowski space, the basis B could be taken to be the final position x on any
given spacelike hypersurface intersecting the future light cone of the initial position.
We now consider what constraints our notion of naturality could imply on d. If d were to define a metric on the
space of paths it would satisfy the following conditions:
1. d(P,Q) ≥ 0 for all P and Q (non-negativity),
2. d(Q,P ) = d(Q,P ) (symmetry),
3. d(P,Q) = 0 if and only if P = Q (identity of indiscernibles),
4. d(P,R) ≤ d(P,Q) + d(Q,R) (triangle inequality).
Of these, only non-negativity is strictly needed for our present discussion. The symmetry postulate also seems very
natural at first sight, but there turns out to be some motivation to consider asymmetric distances when considering
paths in Minkowski space or other fixed background Lorentzian spacetimes. We will not adopt the identity of
indiscernibles as an axiom here for two reasons. First, it is useful in simple toy models to allow distinct neighbouring
paths to have zero separation rather than very small separation. Second, some interesting candidates for Lorentz
invariant distance functions between paths in Minkowski space have the property d(P, P ) > 0 for some non-causal
paths P . The distance functions in our toy models also violate the triangle inequality. While this too seems a plausible
candidate postulate for a fundamental theory, it is also easy to find simple distance measures that violate it. We
thus do not impose the last three postulates as axioms at present, but keep them in mind as natural possibilities to
consider adopting in a fundamental formulation of a probabilistic path theory.
In summary, then, in what follows below, d is supposed to give some intuitively sensible measure of path separation,
and to be non-negative, but is not necessarily a metric.
We also require a physically motivated condition on d: that d(P,Q) ≈ 0 when the difference between P and Q
is “microscopic” and d(P,Q) ≫ 1 when the difference is “macroscopic”. The motivating idea here is that the path
distance d is ultimately defined by a new fundamental theory generalising quantum theory, and that this definition
of d is what ultimately allows the theory to determine the boundary between the “microscopic” and “macroscopic”.
If we are to produce a generalization of quantum theory that has not already been falsified, d should be chosen
so that the predictions are consistent with experiment and observation to date. So, paths P and Q in experiments
that demonstrate the path interference predicted by standard quantum theory should be microscopically separated:
d(P,Q) ≈ 0. However, if we see an object following an approximately classical trajectory, consistent with a path P ,
and there is another path Q describing a trajectory that we can distinguish from P by observation, so that we also
see that the object does not follow Q, then P and Q should be macroscopically separated: d(P,Q)≫ 1.
In a truly fundamental formulation of a new theory, the probability rule should apply to paths between possible
initial and final states of the universe, and so should presumably be formulated within some quantum theory of gravity.
We will be rather less ambitious initially in exploring the idea, by making various simplifying assumptions.
First, we will suppose the probability rule makes sense for paths in the appropriate configuration spaces in quantum
mechanics or quantum field theory, for finite time intervals or between finitely separated space-like hypersurfaces. This
does not necessarily conflict with the idea that the fundamental formulation should be for paths between initial and
7final cosmological states. The intuition, rather, is that the restricted application of the probability rule should be
derivable as an approximation from the fundamental version. Similarly, the intuition is that the application to
quantum mechanics should be derivable from that to quantum field theory, which in turn should be derivable from
that to some underlying unified theory that includes gravity.
Second, we simplify considerably further by considering discrete toy model versions of path integrals, in which there
are only finitely many relevant paths. In the simplest toy models we label these paths numerically, with a distance
function depending on the abstract label, rather than defining an underlying path geometry and a distance function
based on that geometry. We assign the phases of the paths in these toy models by fiat rather than deriving them
from a specified Lagrangian and action. As in our earlier toy model, these phases are chosen so as to mimic the
essential features of the sort of phase distribution one might expect from a realistic path integral calculation, but are
not directly derived from any path integral. Our aim is to illustrate the possibility of extracting new physical insight
from the path probability postulate (2) for some reasonably sensible choices of the distance function d(P,Q), without
worrying about questions of rigour. We leave for future exploration the scope for physically sensible choices of d(P,Q)
for which the path probability postulate may be rigorously defined in realistic models.
REAL PATH QUANTUM THEORY IN TOY MODELS
In principle, the path probability postulate is intended to be an interesting possibility to explore in any physical
theory, including quantum gravity theories with no fixed background space-time. In the first instance, though, we
are mainly interested in exploring the cases with a fixed background space-time. In the non-relativistic case, we
focus here on the example of Galilean spacetime with trivial topology R × R3. In the relativistic case, we focus
here on Minkowski space and on other fixed background Lorentzian space-times with the same topology. Of course,
more general space-times with non-trivial topologies are also interesting. We focus on these examples because they
are sufficient to illustrate the generality of real path quantum theory ideas, without complicating the discussion by
considering non-trivial topologies.
The toy models we consier next are abstract enough that they could apply to each of these cases and to others. To
be concrete, it may be helpful to think of them as models in Galilean space-time, and so we will assume this for now.
We make some comments later about possible choices of distance function that give potentially physically interesting
versions of the path probability postulate in Minkowski and other Lorentzian space-times.
Modelling single particle beams: Real path quantum theory in the toy model M1
We now return to our toy path integral model M1 above, and develop it as a model for real path quantum theory,
by adding a choice of distance function. Recall that we previously proposed M1 as a discrete model of paths of the
centre of mass motion of a massive object between two specified points A and B in space-time, where B is in the
causal future of A. Intuitively, we expect such an object approximately to follow the least action path from A to B,
even though we cannot rigorously justify this intuition from within standard quantum theory.
The same model M1 can also be thought of as a model for a single quantum particle in a beam between a source
A and a detector B that – in the ordinary intuitive but unrigorous language generally used about particle beams in
experiments – approximately defines a single definite path from A to B,
We will use the model to consider both cases. In either case, the point is to show that, if we apply real path
quantum theory to the model, we can rigorously justify the intuitive expectations.
For the moment we are interested in calculating path probabilities conditioned on fixed initial and final points, A
and B. As above, then, we will suppose there are N possible paths between A and B, where N is a large positive
integer, the paths are labelled Pj for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , and they have corresponding phases Sj = S(Pj) and amplitudes
Aj = exp(−iSj). The label j is supposed to correspond to the geometric location of the path in space-time, in such
a way that paths Pi, Pi+1 with adjacent labels are in some sense neighbouring, and the difference between labels is
a measure of the separation between paths, and so we will assume that d(Pi, Pj) = f(|i − j|) for some function f .
We note again that this is not entirely realistic. If we think of the paths as living in some discretized Galilean or
Minkowski space, these properties do not generally hold for interesting sets of paths if we use choices of the distance
function that are naturally defined via the underlying geometry. However, it simplifies our model and allows us to
derive some interesting features. The essential points we make also hold in more geometrically realistic models.
We again suppose some set of adjacent paths PM , . . . , PM+K lie in a region in path space where the path phase is
essentially constant, while for the remaining paths the path phase oscillates. Here M is odd and we take N −M −K
8to be even (although this is inessential), 1 < M < M +K < N and K ≪ N . We again take the path amplitudes in
the constant region to all be +1, and take the amplitudes for the paths outside the region to be alternately ±1. So
we have
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤M − 1 , (6)
A(Pi) = 1 for M ≤ i ≤M +K ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M−K for M +K < i ≤ N ,
and thus the path amplitudes listed in order from A1 to AN are
1,−1, . . . , 1,−1, 1, 1, . . .1,−1, 1, . . . ,−1, 1 .
We now take the distance function to be
d(Pi, Pj) = 0 if |i− j| < D , (7)
d(Pi, Pj) = ∞ if |i− j| > D ,
d(Pi, Pj) = log(1/2) if |i− j| = D .
This infinite step function is meant as a simplifying approximation to something more natural, such as
d(Pi, Pj) = exp(|i − j|/D) .
Here we require D ≪ N , M > 2D + 1, and N −M −K > 2D + 1.
Since we are now working within real path quantum theory, we can apply (2) to obtain an explicit expression for
the probability of the particle following any given path:
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1| (
∑
|j−i|<D
A(Pj) +
∑
|j−i|=D
1
2
A(Pj)) |
2 , (8)
where C is the normalisation factor ensuring that
N∑
i=1
Prob(Pi) = 1 .
Modelling a single particle beam
If we think of M1 as modelling a single microscopic particle beam between source A and detector B, the most
immediately interesting case for us is 2D > K (in particular 2D ≫ K, though the calculations depend only on
whether 2D or K is larger). This parameter choice captures the intuition that any model that alters the predictions
of quantum theory by introducing some intrinsic decoherence should ensure that paths lying within a single beam of
a microscopic quantum particle are very far from decohering. (We see no decoherence for microscopic particles even
in interference experiments involving multiple separated beams – a scenario we will model later.)
For 2D > K, and for i further than D from the ends of the list of paths, i.e. in the range D < i < N −D, this gives
Prob(Pi) = 0 if D + 1 < i < M −D or N − (D + 1) > i > M +K +D , (9)
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|K|2 if M +K −D < i < M +D ,
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|(i+D −M)|2 if M < i+D < M +K ,
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|(M +K − i+D)|2 if M < i −D < M +K .
For completeness we also consider the case 2D ≤ K. Here, again for paths Pi away from the ends of list, with i
lying in the range D < i < N −D, we find
Prob(Pi) = 0 if D + 1 ≤ i < M −D or N − (D + 1) ≥ i > M +K +D , (10)
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|2D|2 = 2CD if M +D < i < M +K −D ,
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|(i+D −M)|2 if i−D < M < i+D ,
Prob(Pi) = C(2D)
−1|(M +K − i+D)|2 if i−D < M +K < i+D .
9So, in either case, aside from the paths near the ends of the path list, all paths with non-zero probability are close
to the paths in the region of constant phase, in the sense that their index i is within D of that region. Paths closer
to the region are likelier, while the probabilities fall off towards zero for paths further away.
In both cases boundary effects mean our model also gives slightly nonzero path probabilities for paths near the
ends of the path list:
Prob(Pi) = C(1/4)(i+D −
1
2
)−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ D , (11)
Prob(Pi) = C(1/4)((N − i) +D −
1
2
)−1 for N −D ≤ i ≤ N .
These are artefacts, which would be eliminated if we took the path list to be infinite or imposed periodic boundary
conditions; we ignore them as irrelevant to our discussion.
This toy model thus gives a realist ontology that tells us that, if the particle goes from A to B, then it follows a
definite path. It respects physical intuition, in that the realised path will be close to the region of constant phase in
path space. How close depends on the parameter D that characterizes our chosen distance function in this model.
Although our realist ontology is not part of standard quantum theory, its dependence on K in this model is
consistent with standard intuitions. Our parameter K here models (in a loose intuitive sense, since we are not
considering measures on the set of realistic paths here) the size of the set of paths around the stationary path for
which (S/h¯) is approximately constant in standard path integral quantum theory quantum theory. The Feynman-
Hibbs argument discussed earlier also aims to select a set of roughly equally relevant paths of similar phase around
the stationary point of the action.
However, a new feature of our models is that the ontology and hence the physical predictions also depend on the
distance function d – in this case via the parameter D. The physically relevant paths in our ontology – those with
nonzero probability – are not only those in the stationary phase region, but also those d-close to that region. A
more fundamental new feature of our models, of course, is that they we have a realist ontology: as already noted, the
standard Feynman-Hibbs intuitions have no logical justification in standard path integral quantum theory.
Modelling classical and quasiclassical trajectories
As we noted above, the same toy model can be used to describe the centre of mass motion of a macroscopic object,
which we expect to follow a quasiclassical trajectory. Whether we should take 2D > K or 2D < K here is less clear,
since we do not have strong experimental constraints on quantum interference of general macroscopic objects. Since
both ranges give qualitatively similar results when modelling a single beam, this does not immediately matter. As
shown above, our model suggests that, ignoring boundary artefacts, all the trajectories with non-zero probability are
approximately quasiclassical, in the (newly defined) sense that their index i is within D+ K2 of the path at the centre
of the quasiclassical set (which we take to represent the stationary action path in our model). Trajectories closer to
the quasiclassical set are likelier, and the probabilities tail off towards zero for paths further away.
Our realist ontology thus says that, if a classical object’s centre of mass goes from A to B, then it follows a definite
trajectory, and this trajectory will be approximately the classical one. How good the approximation is depends on
the size K of the set of paths close enough to the classical trajectory that their phase is essentially the same as its,
and on the parameter D that characterizes our distance function. As already noted, the K-dependence is in line
with intuitions based on standard quantum theory. In particular, it supports the conclusions of the Feynman-Hibbs
argument in the context where it originally was meant to apply, namely selecting a set of roughly equally relevant
paths of similar phase around a classical trajectory that is (necessarily) a stationary point of the action. Again, we
have the new feature of dependence on the distance function d, parameterised in our model by D.
Modelling beam interferometry in real path quantum theory
We next consider a toy model, which we call M2, in which there are two different regions in path space where the
path phase is constant. Since we want to model quantum interference of beams with general complex phases we now
let the path amplitudes in these regions take any complex value of modulus one. However, to keep the model simple
we still for the moment suppose the amplitudes outside the regions are alternately ±1. We now have
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤M0 − 1 , (12)
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A(Pi) = exp(−iθ0) for M0 ≤ i ≤M0 +K0 ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M0−K0 for M0 +K0 < i ≤M1 − 1 ,
A(Pi) = exp(−iθ1) for M1 ≤ i ≤M1 +K1 ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M1−K1 for M1 +K1 < i ≤ N ,
where we take M0 to be odd, M1 − M0 − K0 to be odd, N −M1 − K1 to be even, and assume the inequalities
1 < M0 < M0+K0 < M1 < M1+K1 < N , K0 ≪ N , K1 ≪ N , M0 > 2D+1 and N −M1−K1 > 2D+1. The path
amplitudes listed in order from A1 to AN are thus now
1,−1, . . . , 1,−1, exp(−iθ0), exp(−iθ0), . . . exp(−iθ0), 1,−1, . . . , (13)
. . . , 1,−1, exp(−iθ1), exp(−iθ1), . . . exp(−iθ1), 1,−1, . . . , 1,−1 .
The most interesting cases for our discussion are (i) D ≫ K0,K1 and D ≫ M1 +K1 −M0 and (ii) D ≫ K0,K1
and 2D + 1 < M1 −M0 −K0.
In case (i), if i+D > M1 +K1 and i−D < M0 we have
Prob(Pi) ≈ C|((K0 + 1) exp(−iθ0) + (K1 + 1) exp(−iθ1))|
2(2D)−1 . (14)
In other words, these path probabilities are defined by an interference term, which is essentially the term that would
arise from two beams with respective amplitudes (K0 + 1) exp(−iθ0) and (K1 + 1) exp(−iθ1).
For i in the range where i − D < M0 and M0 ≤ i + D < M1 + K1, the paths Pi also have significantly nonzero
probabilities representing partial interference; similarly for i in the range where i+D > M1 +K1 and M0 ≤ i−D ≤
M1 +K1.
As in the previous model, we also have slightly nonzero probabilities for paths near the ends of the list, which we
again ignore as artefacts.
In case (ii), if i−D < M0 and i+D > M0 +K0, we have
Prob(Pi) ≈ C|((K0 + 1) exp(−iθ0))|
2(2D)−1 = C(K0 + 1)
2(2D)−1 . (15)
Similarly, if i−D < M1 and i+D > M1 +K1, we have
Prob(Pi) ≈ C|((K1 + 1) exp(−iθ1))|
2(2D)−1 = C(K1 + 1)
2(2D)−1 . (16)
Outside these ranges, ignoring boundary artefacts, the path probabilities fall to zero.
So, in case (ii), paths with significantly nonzero probability are associated with (and d-close to) either the region
of paths with constant amplitude exp(−iθ0) or the region of paths with constant amplitude exp(−iθ1). However, in
this case, the values of these probabilities are given solely by the corresponding “beam strengths” (Ki + 1)
2, with no
interference term.
In this model, then, we represent particle beam amplitude phases by path amplitude phases. The beam strengths
correspond to the number of adjacent paths with the same amplitude, and these paths collectively represent the beam.
The model gives a real path ontology according to which any path with significantly nonzero probability is d-close to
at least one beam. If the beams themselves are d-close, these probabilities display the familiar quantum interference.
However, if the beams are widely separated by the d measure, even though they ultimately recombine at the same
point, the probabilities have no interference term. The particle follows a path d-close to one beam or the other, with
probabilities proportional to the respective beam strengths.
Multiple beam interference
Consider now a quantum multiple beam interferometry experiment in which – according to the standard intuitive
but unrigorous language used to describe beam interferometry – a particle leaves a source A, follows one of n linear
beam paths BP0, BP1, . . . BPn−1 to one of n different slits S0, S2, . . . Sn−1, and then follows a linear path from the
relevant slit to a point B on a detecting screen. Suppose that, in a realistic description of the experiment, the beam
path BPi has action Si = S(BPi), with exp(iSi) = exp(iθi), where the phases θi obey 0 ≤ θi < 2pi, and that the
beam along BPi has strength αi > 0, with
∑
i α
2
i = 1.
We can extend our two beam model M2 to model multiple beams by introducing multiple regions of Ki adjacent
paths of constant phase exp(iθi), where (Ki+1) is proportional to αi. We obtain the same qualitative features. If all
beams are d-close, our model will reproduce standard interference; if each pair of beams is d-distant, it predicts none.
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In particular, to recover the standard quantum interference predictions, we need to suppose that the beam path
separations are microscopic: d(BPi, BPj) ≈ 0 for each i, j. We can achieve this with a generalization of M2 (call it
M3) in which the paths P1, . . . , PN have amplitudes
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤M0 − 1 , (17)
A(Pi) = exp(−iθ0) for M0 ≤ i ≤M0 +K0 ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M0−K0 for M0 +K0 < i ≤M1 − 1 ,
A(Pi) = exp(−iθ1) for M1 ≤ i ≤M1 +K1 ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−M1−K1 for M1 +K1 < i ≤M2 − 1 ,
. . .
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−Mn−2−Kn−2 for Mn−2 +Kn−2 < i ≤Mn−1 − 1 ,
A(Pi) = exp(−iθn−1) for Mn−1 ≤ i ≤Mn−1 +Kn−1 ,
A(Pi) = (−1)
i−Mn−1−Kn−1 for Mn−1 +Kn−1 < i ≤ N ,
where we take M0, M1 −M0 −K0, M2 −M1 −K1, . . ., Mn−1 −Mn−2 −Kn−2, to be odd and N −Mn−1 −Kn−1 to
be even. The path amplitudes listed in order from A1 to AN are thus now
1,−1, . . . , 1,−1, exp(−iθ0), exp(−iθ0), . . . exp(−iθ0), 1,−1, . . . , (18)
. . . , 1,−1, exp(−iθ1), exp(−iθ1), . . . exp(−iθ1), 1,−1, . . . , 1,−1
. . .
. . . , 1,−1, exp(−iθn−1), exp(−iθn−1), . . . exp(−iθn−1), 1,−1, . . . , 1,−1 .
Here the beam path BPj is modelled by paths Pi in the range Mj ≤ i ≤ Mj + Kj. We need to take 1 < M0 <
M0 +K0 < M1 < M1 +K1 < . . . < Mn−1 +Kn−1 < N , to ensure the beams in our model do not overlap. Ki ≪ N .
We also want to take Mn−1 + Kn−1 −M0 ≪ 2D + 1, to ensure the beam paths are all d-close. Finally, we take
M0 ≫ 2D + 1 and N −Mn−1 −Kn−1 ≫ 2D + 1, ensuring that there are many more paths “outside” the region in
which the interferometry beams lie than “inside” that region.
Real path quantum theory, via (2), then tells us that the probability distribution of real paths is dominated by
≈ 2D paths around the beam paths, each of which has probability proportional to
(2D)−1|
∑
i
(Ki + 1) exp(−iθi)|
2 .
Note that, if we take this model seriously as a guide to ordinary quantum interferometry experiments, it suggests
the real path in such experiments is generally very unlikely to be a path lying within any beam BPj – i.e. to be one of
the beam paths in our model. In our model the beam paths are not only all d-close to one another, but considerably
closer than this constraint requires. Our model suggests that a real path can be d-close to them while following some
exotic non-beam path through the region in which the beam paths lie, or while going well outside that region.
Of course, our toy model relies on many simplifying assumptions. A full path integral description would include
infinitely many paths with phases close to θi in the neighbourhood of each Pi, and infinitely many more exotic paths
that are not piecewise linear and have rapidly fluctuating phases. Moreover, even in 1 + 1 dimensions, these paths
are not geometrically related in a way that allows the sort of one dimensional representation that our toy model and
choice of distance function assume. Nor is it evident which choice of distance function one should make for the full
set of quantum paths, even for a single particle travelling between two specified points in space-time. These issues
clearly ultimately need to be addressed, and we discuss some of them further below. Our present aim, though, is to
extract intuitions from and explore the range of possibilities suggested by discrete toy models. We consider next ways
of modelling multi-particle systems, beginning by considering models of interferometry experiments that include the
measuring apparatus as well as the interfering particle.
Real paths in multi-particle configuration space
We now extend our toy model discussion to consider an interference experiment with interfering beams in which
the particle is emitted by a source at A and may arrive at any of various points Bj (for 1 ≤ j ≤ l) on the screen.
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A parsimonious way of doing this is to continue to model the experiment by considering only paths of the interfering
particle. Thus, we could consider sets of paths Lj = {P
j
1 , . . . , P
j
Nj
} from A to Bj , with corresponding amplitudes of
the form (17), now characterized by j-dependent parameters M jk ,K
j
k, θ
j
k, nj , Nj (where 0 ≤ k ≤ nj − 1). We can then
apply the path probability postulate to the union of these sets of paths – i.e. calculate path probabilities conditioned
on the particle arriving at any of the points Bj . In the regime considered above, with M
j
nj−1
+ Kjnj−1 − M
j
0 ≪
2D+1,M j0 ≫ 2D+1 and Nj −Mnj−1−Knj−1 ≫ 2D+1 for each j, the model reproduces quantum interference for
paths from A to any given Bj . It gives the probability of the particle arriving at Bj as approximately proportional to
|
∑
k
(Kjk + 1) exp(−iθ
j
k)|
2 ,
and so the quantum predictions for the observed detection ratios Prob(A → Bj)/Prob(A → Bk) are recovered, as
expected.
To explore a bit further, we want to extend the model further to consider paths in the multi-particle configuration
space of the interfering particle together with constituent particles of the screen, and continue the model from the
time (say t = 0) at which the particle is emitted up to some time (t = Tf) significantly after the time (t = Th) at
which it hits the screen.
We take there to be Z constituent particles of the screen. For the purposes of this model we suppose that, in a
quasiclassical description of the physics, a subset of Zj of these are appreciably disturbed by an impact at Bj . We
make the further simplifying assumptions that the possible impact points Bj are discrete, and the relevant subsets
of Zj disturbed particles corresponding to distinct Bj are disjoint. Rather than considering paths for each individual
particle, though, we first model the screen paths in multi-particle configuration space by essentially the same toy
model considered above. Between time t = 0 and Th, we consider the beam particle and screen paths separately; after
Th we use a single set of paths to model both. The idea here is that on impact the beam particle becomes part of the
screen, indistinguishable from the other screen particles: this is not an essential assumption but simplifies the model.
We expect screen particles to follow a quasiclassical trajectory at all times, and we model this by adapting model
M1. Between times 0 and Th, we take there to be N
′ possible configuration space paths in our discrete model of the Z-
particle screen’s configuration space, listed in order as P ′1, P
′
2, . . . , P
′
N ′ . Of these, there are K
′+1 adjacent paths with
phases +1, beginning with P ′M ′ , and the rest have alternating phase. We suppose there are N
′′ possible configuration
space paths describing the (Z + 1) screen particles (now including the absorbed beam particle) after time Th, listed
in order as P ′′1 , P
′′
2 , . . . , P
′′
N ′′ . We suppose that the phases of the screen particles’ paths after the beam particle is
absorbed are effectively determined by the absorption point Bj via some interaction Hamiltonian. Specifically, if we
consider paths in which the interferometry particle arrives at Bj , we suppose the K
′′ + 1 adjacent screen particle
paths PM ′′
j
, PM ′′
j
+1, . . . , PM ′′
j
+K′′ to have phases +1, while the other screen particle paths have alternating phases
±1. We assume the quasiclassical paths corresponding to the distinct absorption points are ordered and separated
by more than (2D + 1) from each other and the endpoints, so that 2D + 1 < M ′′1 < M
′′
1 + K
′′ + 2D + 1 < M ′′2 <
. . . < M ′′l−1 +K
′′ + 2D+ 1 < M ′′l < M
′′
l +K
′′ + 2D+ 1 < N ′′. We also assume K ′′ ≪ N ′′. Note that we take K ′′ to
be a constant, independent of the impact point Bj. This is to ensure that the probability of observing an impact at
point Bj is not retroactively affected by the dynamics of the screen particles after impact. This is required so that
our model reflects quantum unitarity in the quantum limit in which d(Pi, Pj) = 0 for all paths Pi, Pj . Allowing K
′′
to depend on the impact point Bj would mean that the post-interaction dynamics of screen particles would affect the
probabilities of detecting the beam particle at given locations on the screen, strongly violating both unitarity and the
no-signalling principle.[35]
The possible complete paths from t = 0 to t = Tf , including an absorption at the screen point Bj at t = Th, then
take the form
({particle path P ji } ⊗ {screen path P
′
k})⊕ {post− absorption screen path P
′′
m}} ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ Nj , 1 ≤ k ≤ N
′ , and 1 ≤ m ≤ N ′′.
Here ⊗ denotes the path in (Z + 1)-particle configuration space given by the product of the relevant particle and
screen paths, running from t = 0 to t = Th, and ⊕ denotes the composition of a path of this type with a post-absorption
screen path that runs from t = Th to t = Tf .
We need to define distance functions for products of paths and compositions of paths. For the moment let us take
d(P ⊗ P ′, Q⊗Q′) = max((d(P,Q), d(P ′, Q′)) , d(P ⊕Q,P ′ ⊕Q′) = max(d(P, P ′), d(Q,Q′)) . (19)
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This ensures that (as usual neglecting boundary artefacts in the model) the non-zero probability paths take the
form
(P ji ⊗ P
′
k)⊕ P
′′
m ,
where P ji is any nonzero probability particle path in the single-particle interferometry model with endpoint Bj , P
′
k is
any screen path up to time Th within D of the quasiclassical paths, and P
′′
m is any post-absorption screen path within
D of those quasiclassical paths that describe the screen after an absorption at Bj.
It also ensures that we again recover the quantum predictions for detection probability ratios
Prob(A→ Bj)/Prob(A→ Bk)
in this extended model.
While it is encouraging that we can find a simple model in which the one-particle path probability postulate follows
from applying the path probability postulate to a model that includes a measuring apparatus or environment (the
screen) as well as the measured particle, the assumptions used in this model raise many questions. To list just a few:
Could we obtain similar results from a more realistic model in which paths for all (Z + 1) particles are treated on
a equal footing? In which paths live in discretized Galilean or Minkowski space-time, with three spatial dimensions,
and the distance function depends (only) on the space-time geometry? Or in which we consider the full set of paths in
ordinary continuous Galilean or Minkowski space-time? Is there a compelling reason to assume that d(P⊗P ′, Q⊗Q′) =
max((d(P,Q), d(P ′, Q′) and d(P ⊕Q,P ′⊕Q′) = max(d(P, P ′), d(Q,Q′)), or are there other interesting options? What
form do we expect the distance function d to take in a realistic quantum path integral treatment of real systems? Is it
necessarily reasonable to take the distinct quasiclassical outcomes of measurements to be necessarily d-distant, as we
did in our model? If so, is this because of the number of particles whose typical quasiclassical trajectories are distinct
for distinct outcomes, or because of the total mass of these particles? Or is it also relevant that the quasiclassical
trajectories remain distinct indefinitely: is the length of time (or in the relativistic case, proper path time) for which
paths are distinguishable as (or even more) relevant as their spatial separation? How should particle interactions be
handled in real path quantum theory? Can we find prescriptions that do not rely on the approximation in which
they are treated by introducing interaction potentials in the Schrodinger equation for each pair of particles, and
assuming that the particle number is fixed? Could and should the distance function d(P,Q) depend on interactions
– for instance on the relationships between the vertices in Feynman diagrams corresponding to paths P and Q – in a
more fundamental field-theoretic treatment?
We believe the first two of these questions can be satisfactorily (and positively) answered by somewhat more
sophisticated toy models. As the remaining questions illustrate, though, there is a limit to what toy models can
persuasively establish. Fundamental issues need to be addressed in more realistic settings. In what follows we set out
some intuitions and possibilities to explore, in the hope of both clarifying the vision underlying real path quantum
theory and encouraging wider interest in the research program.
POSSIBLE PATH DISTANCE FUNCTIONS AND THEIR PHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS
Choices of distance function for single particle paths
What if we apply (2) to realistic path integral models? A full path integral description of an interferometry
experiment (whether of a microscopic or macroscopic object) involves uncountably many paths, most of which are
not close to being the piecewise linear paths that we normally consider as the interfering beams.
If real path quantum theory does make sense in realistic models, it has one immediately clear empirical prediction.
Standard quantum interference should be observed for interferometry experiments where the beam paths are close, as
determined by the distance function d. However, quantum interference should not be observed when the beam paths
are widely d-separated. For some choices of d, these predictions are very broadly qualitatively similar to those made by
dynamical collapse models and other intrinsic decoherence models, although the underlying models are conceptually
and ontologically quite different. For other choices of d, the predictions are qualitatively very different from those
made by any existing intrinsic decoherence model.
For a microscopic object, given that the beam paths are microscopically separated from one another, and that
there are infinitely many non-beam paths between the beam paths, we expect most paths that are microscopically
separated from the beam paths to be non-beam paths. If (2) gives a well-defined probability measure on the paths, we
thus expect a very large set {Pλ}λ∈Λ of possible paths from A to B, and a probability measure on Λ that is roughly
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uniform on a large subset. We also expect that the total probability of finding the microscopic object at B is, to very
good approximation, the quantum probability. However, it isn’t evident that (2) does give a well-defined probability
measure on paths, for interesting choices of the distance d.
At best, then, we get a rather more complicated picture than toy models suggest, which needs to be worked out
carefully, but which at first sight is not evidently inconsistent nor evidently in contradiction with experiment or
observation. At worst, we have a prescription that as yet makes no rigorous sense. However, either way, there are
interesting ways to alter (2) so as to simplify – and, one might hope, rigorize – the picture. We turn to these next.
Is there a unique natural choice of d? Even for single particle paths in Galilean space-time, there seem to be many
possible candidates. Consider two paths
P = { (xP (t), t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } , Q = { (xQ(t), t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ T } ,
for a particle of mass m between points A = (xP (0), 0) = (xQ(0), 0) and B = (xP (T ), T ) = (xQ(T ), T ). Some simple
possible definitions of d that capture arguably natural notions of path separation include
d(P,Q) = max
0≤t≤T
|xP (t)− xQ(t)| , (20)
d(P,Q) = m max
0≤t≤T
|xP (t)− xQ(t)| ,
d(P,Q) =
∫ T
0
dt |xP (t)− xQ(t)| ,
d(P,Q) = T−1
∫ T
0
dt |xP (t)− xQ(t)| ,
d(P,Q) = m
∫ T
0
dt |xP (t)− xQ(t)| ,
d(P,Q) = (
∫ T
0
dt |xP (t)− xQ(t)|
2)1/2 .
One might also explore definitions sensitive to the first and/or higher path derivatives, for example
d(P,Q) =
∫ T
0
dt |x′P (t)− x
′
Q(t)| . (21)
Of course, many other options, or combinations of these options, could be explored.
It seems then, even for thinking about real path quantum theory in the context of single particle interferometry,
that we either need some new compelling theoretical reason for picking out some particular distance function, or
empirical guidance. A theoretical preference could perhaps come either from a new theoretical idea purporting to
explain why nature might follow the path probability postulate for some specific choice(s) of distance function, or
conceivably from establishing that the path probabilities are rigorously definable only for some specific choice(s).
But, absent further help from theory, if we take the idea of real path quantum theory seriously, it seems we need
to continue exploring empirically whether quantum interference fails, and to be open to the possibility that the
transition between interference and effective decoherence could be governed by almost any physical parameter or
combination of parameters: maximum beam separation, average beam separation, separation time, particle mass,
and so on. This is no doubt discouraging for those hoping for a precise prediction of how and where quantum theory
should break down. It may, however, point to the appropriately scientifically open-minded strategy of encouraging
experimental tests of quantum interference in every possibly interesting new physical parameter range. If real path
quantum theory is relatively theoretically underconstrained, by the same token it points to previously unconsidered
theoretical possibilities. It suggests our theoretical understanding of the range of plausible empirical implications of
unified models of quasiclassical and quantum physics has been too limited and should be broadened.
Many particles and composition rules
These comments apply even more strongly when considering multi-particle systems. We have already noted inter-
esting choices of distance function that violate the path sum rule
d(P ⊕Q,P ′ ⊕Q′) = max(d(P, P ′), d(Q,Q′)) .
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proposed in (19). The path product rule
d(P ⊗ P ′, Q⊗Q′) = max((d(P,Q), d(P ′, Q′) ,
is equally open to question. Other seemingly mathematically natural possibilities for n distinguishable particles
include
d(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn, Q1 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗Qn) =
∑
i
d(Pi, Qi) , (22)
d(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn, Q1 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗Qn) =
1
n
∑
i
d(Pi, Qi),
d(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn, Q1 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗Qn) = (
∏
i
d(Pi, Qi))
1/n ,
and of course many others could be considered.
Even more generally, even for distinguishable particles, in principle the distance function for a product of paths
need not be expressible as a function of individual path distance functions at all.
For indistinguishable particles, clearly, the distance function should respect the permutation symmetry. One possi-
bility would be to frame a definition of a symmetric distance function dsymm in terms of one of the distance functions
above:
dsymm(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn, Q1 ⊗Q2 ⊗ . . .⊗Qn) = min
ρ
d(P1 ⊗ P2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Pn, Qρ(1) ⊗Qρ(2) ⊗ . . .⊗Qρ(n)) ,
where the minimum is taken over all permutations ρ.
One further significant theoretical constraint here arises from the fact that, if real path quantum theory is funda-
mentally correct, it should in principle be applied to the entire universe, while if it is to be of any empirical use, it
must be applicable to small subsystems. An effective d for single or few particle subsystems must be derivable from
the definition of d for a many-particle system, even if the latter is not directly defined in terms of the former. But
this still leaves many possibilities.
Lorentz covariant rules for paths in Minkowski space
A major reason for optimism that the quantum path integral may be fundamental is that – formally at least – it can
naturally incorporate Lorentz and other symmetries. Encouragingly for real path quantum theory, we can also find
relatively simple and seemingly natural Lorentz invariant measures of distance defined on reasonably general classes
of paths.
Consider points A and B in Minkowski space, where B is in the causal future of A. Let SA and SB be spacelike
hyperplanes through A and B respectively.
Let P = (XP (λ) : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) be a parametrised path in Minkowski space between points A and B, where
XP (0) = A, XP (1) = B, and the four-vector XP is a continuous function of λ. Take the Minkowski metric with the
convention that spacelike vectors have positive length and c = 1, i.e. ∆(x, y, z, t) = x2 + y2 + z2 − t2. We say P is
a causal path if XP (λ
′) is in the causal future of XP (λ) whenever λ
′ > λ. Clearly, if P is causal, it lies between SA
and SB. We say P is non-causal otherwise. We say P is anti-causal if there exists λ
′ > λ such that XP (λ
′) is in the
causal past of XP (λ).
Let Q be a path that is not anti-causal (but not necessarily causal) path also lying between SA and SB.
One simple candidate measure of distance for two such paths P,Q between points A and B in Minkowski space-time
is
d1(P,Q) = max
λ,λ′
(∆(xP (λ) − xQ(λ
′))) ,
the maximum spacelike separation between any pair of points on the two paths.
Note that if Q is not causal, it includes two spacelike separated points, and so if we extended this definition to pairs
of non-causal paths we would have d1(Q,Q) > 0, i.e. d1 would violate the identity of indiscernibles. The distance
function thus distinguishes causal paths P , for which d1(P, P ) = 0, from non-causal paths Q, for which d1(Q,Q) > 0.
Given this distinction, one arguably natural prescription for real path quantum theory in Minkowski space is then
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to allow only causal paths to be realised, while allowing amplitudes from non-causal but not anticausal paths to
contribute to their probabilities via the path probability postulate (2). (Anticausal paths are ignored altogether in
this prescription.) This would have the intuitively satisfactory consequence that only causal paths can be physically
realised. It is also interesting to explore whether allowing all paths to be realised has physically sensible consequences,
i.e. whether the fact that d1(Q,Q) > 0 for non-causal paths Q, and the highly oscillatory variation of the phase in
the neighbourhood of such paths, in any case suppresses the probability of highly non-causal paths being realised.
Another interesting Lorentz invariant distance function for pairs of paths P,Q with P causal and Q not anti-causal,
is
d2(P,Q) =
∫
P
dτ(λ)max
λ′
∆(xP (λ)− xQ(λ
′)) , (23)
where τ(λ) is the proper time along P from A to xP (λ). This measure is sensitive not only to the space-like separations
between points on the paths, but to the the proper time interval along P for there is any given space-like separation
between P and Q. Note that in this form this measure is not defined if P is not causal, and is not symmetric for
causal P and Q. It also does not satisfy the identity of indiscernibles: if P is an everywhere null causal path, then
we have d2(P,Q) = 0 for all paths Q.
(The definition could, of course, be extended in various ways. For example, for non-causal but not anti-causal P,Q,
we could define
d′2(P,Q) =
∫ ′
P
dτ(λ)max
λ′
∆(x′P (λ) − xQ(λ
′)) , (24)
where P ′ is the not necessarily connected sub-path of P that is the maximal sub-path comprising causal segments,
and τ is now the proper time along each such segment. We could also symmetrise the definition by hand:
d
′′
2 (P,Q) =
1
2
(d′(P,Q) + d′(Q,P )) . (25)
As in the Galilean case, we could generalise in other ways too, for example by using monotonically increasing functions
of ∆(xP (λ) − xQ(λ
′)) in d1 or d2, by defining a proper time average version of d2 for non-null causal paths P by
taking 1τP d2 (where τP is the total proper time along P ) and so forth.
We stress that, as in the Galilean case, the suggestion here is not that any one of these distance functions (or
some combination), or the path probability postulate (2), or the prescription that only causal paths can be realised,
must necessarily be right. There are many other possibilities. What we find encouraging is that the existence
of Lorentz invariant distance functions transforms a conceptual problem (is there any conceivable realist Lorentz
invariant generalisation of quantum theory?) into a technical problem (can we find a well-defined version of real path
quantum theory for some choice(s) of Lorentz invariant distance function and path probability postulate?). Although
the technical problem is formidable and we are far from understanding whether it is solvable, the existence of Lorentz
invariant path distance functions suggests that there is no purely conceptual no-go result preventing the possibility of
Lorentz invariant path-based solutions to the quantum reality problem.
Generally covariant path distance functions
We can also find relatively simple generally covariant definitions of the distance for a reasonably general class
of paths in fixed Lorentzian background space-times other than Minkowski space. For simplicity we focus here on
space-times with no closed time-like curves and trivial spatial topology.
For two non-causally separated points X,Y in such a space-time we define a distance function, ∆˜(X,Y ) to be the
minimum spacelike distance along a space-like geodesic from X to Y .
Now consider points A and B in our spacetime, where B is in the causal future of A. Let SA and SB be spacelike
hypersurfaces through A and B respectively, with the property that their proper time separation is bounded. That
is, if we define τ(X,Y ) to be the maximum proper time along any causal path from a point X to some point Y in its
causal future, we have τ(X,Y ) ≤ τ0 for all X ∈ S and Y ∈ S
′.
Now, defining causal and anti-causal paths as before let P be a causal path between A and B, which (necessarily)
lies between SA and SB, and let Q be a path that is not anti-causal (but not necessarily causal) between A and B
that also lies between SA and SB .
17
We can define
d(P,Q) = max
λ,λ′
(∆˜(xP (λ), xQ(λ
′))) ,
where as before λ, λ′ define parametrisations of P,Q respectively and we use the definition of ∆˜(X,Y ) just given.
As in the Minkowski case, extending this definition to pairs of non-causal paths would imply d(Q,Q) > 0 for non-
causal Q. Again, one arguably natural option for real path quantum theory is to postulate that only causal paths can
be realised, while allowing amplitudes from non-causal but not anticausal paths to contribute to their probabilities
via the path probability postulate (2).
The other definitions considered in the Minkowski case can similarly be extended. Once again we stress that, as for
the Galilean and Minkowski space cases, we presently see no compelling reason for singling out any of these particular
definitions of covariant path distance or real path probability prescriptions: the encouraging point is that covariant
definitions exist.
Suppressing unphysical paths
“Pathological” paths – which may traverse many regions of space-time very far from the stationary path and from
each other, and may be very rapidly varying or even undifferentiable – are problematic in standard path integral
quantum theory. Technically, they make it hard to define a computable path integral in realistic models. Physically,
they seem to make it hard to assign a sensible meaning to the path integral, even at the level of intuition: does one
really want to say that the real behaviour of a system is, in some sense, dominated by pathological paths?
The path probability postulate (2), together with the scope for choices of the distance function, offer some hope
of ameliorating or even eliminating these problems. A distance function sensitive to spatial separation would mean
that a pathological path that travels far from the stationary paths makes little contribution to the probability of the
latter being realised. Distance functions sensitive to first or higher derivatives can also suppress the contributions of
rapidly varying or undifferentiable paths. If the intuition that the Feynman-Hibbs argument can be rigorized in real
path quantum theory is justified, then the rapid oscillations of phase of paths in the neighbourhood of pathological
paths tend to suppress the probability of these paths being realised themselves, since their probabilities will be close
to zero.
At the risk of multiplying hypotheses, it is worth mentioning that another strategy for suppressing the probabilities
and amplitudes of undesirably pathological paths could also be used. Real path quantum theory is an example of – in
Bell’s terminology – a beable theory, that is, a theory with a sample space of possible realised ontologies (in this case,
possible paths in the appropriate configuration space) and a probability distribution on that sample space. A quite
general way [24] of producing potentially interesting generalisations of a beable ontology is to allow the probability
of any given configuration of “beables” being realised to depend, via simple rules, directly on the properties of that
configuration, as well as on the Hamiltonian and boundary conditions of the underlying quantum theory.
In the case of real path quantum theory, one could further modify the path probability postulate (2), for example by
adding a prefactor in the form of a non-negative weight function w(P ) that suppresses the probability of pathological
paths P being realised. Thus, we could take
Prob(P ) = C′w(P ) |
∫
dQ exp(−iS(Q)) exp(−d(P,Q))|2 (
∫
dQ exp(−d(P,Q)))−1 , (26)
where w(P ) ≥ 0 is significantly nonzero for physically reasonable paths and small for pathological paths, and the
constant C′ normalizes this new probability distribution. (We have already considered a version of this in suppressing
non-causal paths in Lorentzian space-times.) In principle, one can consider any choice of w(P ): for example, it could
depend on the maximum or typical curvature of the path P , or on some measure(s) of its derivative(s). In Galilean
or Minkowski space-time, one could even ensure that any realised P must be piecewise linear with a characteristic
linear scale, by setting w(P ) = 0 unless P comprises linear segments of given length δ or given proper time δτ , if one
wished to introduce new fundamental scales into the ontology.
Comments on double ontologies and the problem of tails
Superficially, real path quantum theory (in models where it is rigorously defined) has some resemblance to de
Broglie-Bohm theory. In the simplest scenario, that of models of N distinguishable particles, both approaches produce
a probability distribution on trajectories in N particle configuration space.
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In fact, there are major differences. The probability distributions are different, for a given initial quantum state
and Hamiltonian. Real path quantum theory generally predicts different physical outcomes from those of standard
quantum theory, whereas standard de Broglie-Bohm theory predicts the same outcomes. The basic postulates of real
path quantum theory extend naturally to relativistic settings, whereas de Broglie-Bohm theory is hard to relativise.
There is also a significant difference in the ontologies. Standard de Broglie-Bohm theory offers the possibility of
two separate although related ontologies, defined by taking the beables to be respectively the quantum wave function
(or some derivative thereof, such as the mass density) and the de Broglie-Bohm trajectories. That the first of these
choices is identical to the one proposed (albeit in many different versions with many different interpretative strategies)
by many Everettians lead to Deutsch’s well-known charge[7] that “pilot-wave theories are parallel-universe theories
in a state of chronic denial”. Of course, one logically consistent defence for de Broglie-Bohm theorists is observe that
in any physical theory one has to make choices about which parts of the mathematical formalism are beables – i.e.
define the ontology – and which parts are auxiliary, and to decide to declare by fiat that the particle trajectories are
beables while the wave function is not.
Whether one is entirely happy with this defence is ultimately a matter of metaphysical taste. Since in practice
many are not, it seems worth noting that real path quantum theory does not seem vulnerable to the same charge of
a potential or actual double ontology. Paths are fundamental in the formulation of this approach to quantum theory.
It produces a probability distribution on paths. The ontology is as expected from any straightforwardly probabilistic
physical theory: one element of the sample space (in this case one path) is randomly chosen from the probability
distribution, and it is (only) this element that is physically realised. The wave function is not an ontological competitor.
It plays no fundamental role, emerging only – and only in some situations – as an approximately defined quantity
that gives a convenient alternative approximate mathematical description of expected experimental outcomes.
Real path quantum theory also has some resemblance to GRWP and other dynamical collapse models [8, 13, 14].
Like these models, it can preserve quantum interference for suitably microscopic interference experiments, while
predicting an intrinsic decoherence that suppresses interference for suitably macroscopic interference experiments.
Collapse models, like de Broglie-Bohm models, offer the possibility of at least two distinct types of ontology. One is
the “flash ontology” originally defined by Bell for the discrete GRW model [4, 19, 33], or its analogue for continuous
dynamical collapse models. The other is some ontology defined by or derived from the collapse model wave function
(again, for example, via the mass density).
Worries about a double ontology perhaps carry less force for GRW models than for de Broglie-Bohm theory, for
various reasons. First, some might perhaps argue that the “flash ontology” is less compellingly natural than the
trajectory ontology. Second, the two ontologies are in any case roughly aligned – in the sense that, at least on
a (perhaps overly) superficial reading they tell similar stories. In a standard quantum measurement setting, the
collapse model wave function tends towards a description of system and apparatus corresponding to one measurement
outcome, while the component corresponding to the other outcome is swiftly and exponentially suppressed; similarly,
the flashes congregate around apparatus particle position locations corresponding to one outcome, and swiftly and
with increasingly high probability tend to avoid the other. There is no straightforwardly Everettian competitor
ontology here.
Nonetheless, these double ontology worries are not entirely eliminated. In particular, a feature that many have found
problematic is that, although the components of the wave function corresponding to “unselected” outcomes decay
rapidly after measurement, they never entirely disappear, and the physical description of the alternative outcome
remains encoded in these small but nonvanishing components. This “problem of tails” opens up the possibility of
a subtle but persistent residual Everettian ontology. Whether it is a potential concern depends on whether one
is justified in neglecting small amplitude components of the wave function as essentially irrelevant. However, this
very issue lies at the heart of the problem of probability in many-worlds quantum theory [1, 12, 23]. Those (many)
who believe the problem of probability has no satisfactory solution thus find it hard to dismiss the problem of tails
completely. On the other hand, those (also many) who believe the problem of probability in many-worlds quantum
theory does have a satisfactory solution tend also to take many-worlds quantum theory as a satisfactory answer to
the quantum reality problem, and are correspondingly less motivated to take dynamical collapse models seriously in
the first place.
Again, then, it seems worth noting that real path quantum theory does not suffer from a problem of tails. The
wave function plays no fundamental role. One path is randomly chosen to be physically realised. The other paths are
not chosen, and so do not form part of the ontology.
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DISCUSSION
All approaches to quantum theory and its generalisations – whether or not they are motivated by the quantum
reality problem – currently have deep problems, if not in the eyes of their proponents, then certainly in the view
of most dispassionate outsiders. This makes the task of the theorist interested in these fundamental questions very
challenging. We have to strive for conceptual clarity and mathematical rigour. We have to try to understand which
approaches might at least potentially ultimately produce a mathematically and conceptually complete description
of nature, and which are likely dead ends that are bound to fall short of this goal. At the same time, so long as
no approach offers a fully satisfactory solution, we should not neglect potentially useful insights that incompletely
developed models can provide. To list some examples:
Could it be literally true that unitary quantum theory is fundamental and the wave function represents reality,
as Everett first suggested? Can we even make conceptual sense of the idea and recover ordinary science? Many
physicists think not, but few would deny that the idea has been a theoretically and practically useful way of thinking
about quantum theory and quantum information theory, even if it is best thought of as an unrealistic limiting case.
In particular, the idea makes a clear prediction that could not so unambiguously be extracted from pre-Everettian
quantum theory. Namely that, however large and complex a physical system may be, in principle, provided it can be
suitably controlled while effectively isolated from the environment, it will display quantum interference.
Is wave function collapse a real and fundamental physical phenomenon? Perhaps, perhaps not. But the idea
has motivated the theoretically and scientifically fertile dynamical collapse model program, including speculative
but intriguing ideas relating collapse to gravity [8, 25]. Again, these ideas suggest clear predictions: that quantum
interference will fail in a regime where a well-defined collapse model suggests that the superposed states collapse to
a component.
Is Bell’s notion of beables [2, 3] a good way of thinking about fundamental physics, and the right language in which
to address the quantum reality problem? Again, many, perhaps most, physicists presently think not. But nonetheless
the idea motivates new generalisations of quantum theory [21, 24, 34], and new ways of thinking about the relationship
of quantum theory and gravity, that can be scientifically useful and suggest new experimental tests – spin-offs which
might lead to new physics, even if that physics turns out not to be written in the language of beables.
We would thus tentatively suggest that, while further development is of course urgently needed, real path quantum
theory has some scientific yield, even in its presently undeveloped state. This is the motivation to explore empirically
whether quantum interference fails, with an open mind about what governs the transition between interference and
effective decoherence. If we take the idea of real path quantum theory seriously, then until further theoretical
and/or mathematical constraints are uncovered, this transition could be governed by almost any physically interesting
parameter or combination of parameters: maximum beam separation, average beam separation, separation time,
particle mass, and so on.
As we remarked earlier, in one important sense this is scientifically quite discouraging. In an ideal universe, we
might prefer any idea for a generalisation of quantum theory to be strongly constrained (or, even better, to offer a
unique alternative) and to make precise predictions of how and where quantum theory should break down. It would
be pleasing to identify some critical, and preferably soon feasible, experiment that distinguishes between quantum
theory and the generalisation, so that we can refute or confirm the idea once and for all.
However, we do not get to choose the universe we live in, nor the size or structure of the class of mathematically
consistent theories that generalise our best current theories of that universe. Our theoretical understanding of the
class of unified models of quasiclassical and quantum physics and the range of plausible empirical implications of these
models may indeed – as the idea of real path quantum theory presently suggests – have been too limited. It appears
there may be a very large class of consistent generalisations of quantum theory (as Refs. [21, 24] also suggest, using
different ideas and different classes of generalisations from those considered here). Unless and until our theoretical
understanding advances further, it may be – as the preliminary version of real path quantum theory presented here
suggests – that the appropriately scientifically open-minded and curious strategy is to test quantum interference
experimentally in every possibly interesting new physical parameter range, rather than – for example – focussing only
on those picked out by simple dynamical collapse models, well-motivated though tests of dynamical collapse models
certainly are.
One significant theoretical constraint whose implications for real path quantum theory need to be properly un-
derstood is the no-signalling principle. Practically speaking, for models in which a physically sensible multi-particle
or field configuration distance function allows real path quantum theory for small subsystems of the universe to be
approximately derived from a fundamental real path quantum theory for the universe, we do not expect agents’
choices about actions on one small subsystem to have a significant effect on the real path probability distribution of
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another distant small subsystem. So, for such models, we expect no-signalling to be an excellent approximation by
this operational definition. However, the possibility of enforcing no-signalling precisely and in all circumstances, and
the implications of such a constraint, needs further investigation. A failure of no-signalling need not be a reason for
rejecting any form of real path quantum theory, particularly if the observational consequences are negligible. There
are consistent Lorentz invariant generalisations of quantum theory that in principle allow superluminal signalling
but evade causal paradoxes [22]. However, the no-signalling principle remains, at the very least, a very interesting
theoretical constraint on generalizations of quantum theory [15, 26].
The ultimate vision of those who take path integral quantum theory as fundamental to all of physics is a path
integral formulation of quantum gravity and quantum cosmology. It hardly needs saying that it would be very
interesting to explore the possibilities opened up by real path quantum theory in this context, the range of potentially
natural distance functions between cosmological paths, and the possibility of using the path probability postulate and
the properties of distance functions to allow rigorous definitions and calculations.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that the appeal and generality of the path integral formalism and its consequent
possible value in generalising quantum theory and/or addressing the quantum reality problem has of course also been
recognised by others. In particular – to list just those of which we are aware – Sorkin [29, 30], Dowker-Johnston-
Sorkin [9], Gell-Mann and Hartle [11, 17], Stamp [32], and Spekkens [31] have ongoing research programs exploring
these questions from various perspectives. The independent work described here starts from different premises, and
as far as we presently understand things it seems to suggest a different research agenda and qualitatively (as well
as quantitatively) different ontological and experimental conclusions. It would, however, certainly be interesting to
explore possible connections between, or combinations of ideas from, these programs.
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